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TOW ARDS AN AFRICAN COURT 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
STRUCTURING AND THE COURT 
VINCENT O. ORLU NMEHIELLE * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
African human rights discourse assumed a new dimension 1 with the 
adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the 
Charter) in Nairobi in 1981 by the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) of the Organization of Mrican Unity (OAU). The 
Charter was born out of the conviction of the Mrican States of the need 
for a home-grown regional human rights commitment in light of 
international standards laid down by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, other subsequent norm-creating international human rights 
instruments, and the experience of other regions. Further, the Mrican 
states, which had long been preoccupied with their struggles against 
colonial domination, realized that after more than two decades of the end 
of de jure colonialism, a need existed to organize for the protection of the 
* Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Rivers State University of Science and Technology, Port 
Harcourt, Nigeria; LL.B., 1989, (Rivers State University of Science and Technology, Port Harcourt, 
Nigeria);B.L. 1990 (Nigeria), Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, LL.M., 1996, 
(University of Notre Dame Law School, Notre Dame, Indiana); Doctor of Juridical Science (S.1.D.) 
Candidate, (The George Washington University Law School, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.). 
1. Before this time, human rights discourse in Africa centered on the condemnation of 
African colonialism and the terrible practice of apartheid in South Africa. 
27 
1
Orlu Nmehielle: African Court of Human Rights
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000
28 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. 6:1 
rights of African people against violations by their own home 
governments.2 
While these assertions may provide some of the underlying reasons for 
the promulgation of the Charter, the state of human rights in many 
African countries at that time was problematic. Totalitarianism was in 
the air, either in the form of military governments or party-dominated 
autocracies. This threat created much of the regional and international 
outcry, as well as a need for action. 
When the Charter came into force in 1986, many commentators viewed 
the document as unique, impressive in its elaborate provisions, and 
ground breaking in such progressive provisions as "Peoples' rights" and 
the incorporation of economic, social and cultural rights. Yet analysis 
has since shown that the mechanism for the protection and enforcement 
of . human rights under the Charter is not effective. The African 
Commission (the Commission) created under the Charter with the 
responsibility of giving effect to its provisions lacks the necessary 
effective authority to carry out its mandate. The lack of provision for a 
judicial organ, in this case, a court, compounds the problem of the 
weakness of the entire system. 
The purpose of this paper is to argue the need for an African Court of 
Human Rights if African states truly wish to maintain an African human 
rights mechanism. In other words, for an effective African regional 
human rights protection and enforcement mechanism to exist, the 
African system must be made more effective and supplemented with a 
court of human rights. The propsal for an African Court of Human 
Rights will require an amendment of the Charter by a treaty or 
convention. Recent human rights violations include those that took place 
in Nigeria, in former Zaire under Mobutu Seseko, and the carnage and 
genocide in Rwanda. 
This paper is divided into four sections. Section one offers a brief 
evaluation of the current system, with the aim of pointing out its inherent 
weaknesses and possible means to strengthen it. . This necessarily 
involves an evaluation of the Commission and the effectiveness of its 
mandate as a remedy for human rights violations. Section two builds on 
2. For example, the oppressive regimes of Idi Amin's Uganda, Bokasa's Central African 
Empire, and Nguema's Equatorial Guinea, just to mention a few, were viewed internationally as 
paradigmatic of African leadership. The continent's leadership needed to reclaim international 
legitimacy and salvage its image. 
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the previous section to present arguments in favor of a court. Section 
three suggests a structure for the court in terms of composition, basic 
foundation, and its relationship with the Commission. Finally, section 
four focuses on how to empower the court in terms of jurisdiction, 
independence, enforcement of its decisions, and funding. 
The author will draw inspiration from existing international and regional 
mechanisms/ as well as current initiatives in the African region.4 The 
author will comment on and make use of the Draft Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights already in place, 
considering it as a possible treaty or convention-based amendment to the 
African Charter. 
n. BRIEF EV ALUA TION OF THE PRESENT AFRICAN HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
This section will evaluate and analyze some aspects of the mechanism 
bordering on some substantive provisions of the Charter affecting the 
African Commission. These are provisions that tend to clog the effective 
realization of the mandate created by the entire mechanism, particularly, 
the mandate of the Commission and the remedy inherent in the exercise 
of this mandate. This section will not recount the history of the African 
Charter, nor is it intended to describe the process of the mechanism 
established by the Charter in general. 
A. THE AFRICAN COMMISSION 
Under Article 30 of the African Charter, the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples' Rights was established as the implementing 
institution of the Charter, with the basic mandate to "promote Human and 
Peoples' Rights and to ensure their protection in Africa.,,5 The contents 
of this promotional function were elaborated and emphasized in Article 
3. While the African system may not duplicate the Inter-American and European systems, it 
will be very useful to draw from their experiences and evolution. 
4. Such an initiative is the meeting of "government experts on the question of the creation of 
an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights" held in Cape Town, South Africa from September 
6 - 12, 1995, under the auspices of the International Commission of Jurists and the OAU by virtue of 
its Resolution AHG/230(XXX) at the Tunis Summit in June 1994 (in which the Secretary General of 
the OAU was invited to summon experts to meet on the establishment of an African Court for 
Human Rights). This meeting was held in collaboration with the South African Ministry of Justice. 
The meeting came up with a proposed Draft Protocol to the African Charter on the establishment of 
an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. 
5. For the general provisions on the Charter and its composition, see Articles 30 - 44. These 
provisions deal with the basic administrative set-up of the Commission. 
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45 dealing with the mandate of the Commission .. This mandate ranges 
from collection of documents, organizing conferences and seminars, 
formulation of legal principles and rules aimed at the solution of legal 
problems relating to human rights, collaboration with state parties and 
the like. The basic question here is, why is the mandate of the 
commission centered on promotional activities rather than on protection 
and enforcement? There is, no doubt, great need for promotional 
activities especially in the African system. Should promotion, no matter 
how important, take over the place of protection and enforcement? The 
usual answer to the above questions is that at the time the African 
Charter was adopted, member states were not prepared to accept 
anything not contained in the Charter.6 In other words, the Charter was a 
compromise document not meant to be very effective, nor was the 
Commission, its implementing institution. As such, the Charter was not 
intended to go too far in guaranteeing human rights at the African 
regional level. 
It may be argued that given the fact that the Charter was ratified by many 
member states, it was not intended to go very far. Thus, many states 
were prepared to ratify it so long as the Charter did not impose heavy 
burdens. It has been suggested, and rightly so, that one of the key 
purposes of any human rights instrument is the control of state action.7 It 
is also certain that the object and purpose of the Charter is the protection 
of human rights in accordance with international standards rather than a 
particular African standard. However, the Charter was not given the 
power to do these tasks because of the lack of an effective enforcement 
machinery under it. According to Claude E. Welch Jr., "beyond the 
official prose of the Charter, the program of action, and the guidelines for 
national periodic reports, the current situation is far from satisfactory.,,8 
In the opinion of this author, the Charter was, at least in spirit, an 
ineffective compromise. 
6. This view is often attributed to Judge Keba Mbaye, the "father" and principal author of the 
African Charter, who said, "we have already highlighted the inadequacies of the norms conceived 
and elaborated in the Charter. The criticisms that have been made about the prospect are perhaps too 
harsh. We must remember that in 1981, the year in which the African Charter was adopted, Africa 
was not prepared to accept, either materially or institutionally, anything that was not contained in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights." See specifically, the Address by Adama Dieng, 
Secretary General for the International Commission of Jurists at the meeting of government experts 
on the question of the creation of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights held in Cape 
Town, South Africa on September 6 - 12, 1995, in which he quoted Judge Keba Mbaye. 
7. Makau Mutua, The African Human Rights System In a Comparative Perspective: The Need 
for Urgent Reformulation 5 LEGAL FELLOW 31 (1993). 
8. Claude E. Welch, Jr., The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Five 
Year Report and Assessment 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 42 at 53 (1992). WeIch, however, is of the view that 
the situation is not as serious as the Commission's most severe critics allege. 
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Nevertheless, on balance, it appears that the Charter is a limited 
document. It is important to point out the inherent weakness in the entire 
mechanism through a treaty-based amendment. This in tum amounts to a 
correction of these weaknesses based on treaty law, rather than on 
judicial or quasi-judicial pronouncements. One of these weaknesses 
which affects the Commission is the political control which Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government of the OAU exercises over it. The 
Commission is made dependent on the political control of the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government, which, of course, is composed of 
member states whose actions the Commission is set up to consider. 
One basic problem presented by this control is the lack of publicity given 
to the Commission's work. Article 59 of the Charter, which deals with 
the Commission's procedure, provides that "all measures taken within 
the provisions of the present Charter shall remain confidential until such 
a time as the Assembly of Heads of State and Government [AHSG] shall 
otherwise decide." The Commission interprets this to mean that it 
cannot mention the cases, nor the countries complained against, nor the 
stages reached in individual cases.9 Further, the Commission cannot 
even publish its report, as indicated by subsection 2 of Article 59. Under 
section 59(2) the chairman of the Commission can only publish the 
Commission's report on the decision of the AHSG. From the inception 
of the African System, the AHSG has not readily authorized the 
publication of any report of the Commission until recently. This lack of 
publicity has given a wide impression that the communication procedure 
of the Commission cannot be relied upon by potential petitioners, 10 
resulting in few communications addressed to the Commission. 
What effect will a human rights mechanism have if the freedom to make 
its activities public is removed? The effect of publicity in the field of 
human rights protection cannot be overemphasized. Other international 
procedures encourage the pUblication of reports and activities of the 
systems under which they are set up. The successes of the Inter 
American and European systems were largely achieved by the freedom 
they enjoyed to publicize their activities. Reports of the European 
Commission are published in nearly all cases by the Committee of 
Ministers,11 while the Inter American Commission decides on its own, by 
virtue of article 51(3) of the American Conventi?n, Human Rights, 
9. Wolfgang Benedek, The African Charter and Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights; 
How to Make it More Effective, I NETH. Q.H.R. 25 at 29 (1993). 
10. [d. 
11. [d.; European Convention on Human Rights, art. 32(3). 
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decides whether to publish its report. Thus, it is desirable for the Charter 
to mandate the Commission to publish its reports in cases that come 
before it. 
Second, the Commission lacks adequate resources, equipment, and 
support to make it truly effective. The serious financial problems of the 
OAD affect the Commission, and have prevented it from operating at its 
full capacity. There is no doubt that the OAD is in financial crisis, due to 
the poverty of the majority of its member states who cannot and do not 
live up to their financial obligations. One example of the dearth of 
financial resources is the failure to construct the planned information and 
documentation center. Yet there have been increasing human rights 
violations in Africa, and thus, more need for the Commission to be able 
to do the work it is set up to do. The hope is that member states will 
endeavor to make the Commission more financially viable. There is also 
a need for more international financial support for the Commission if the 
international outcry against the terrible human rights situation in Africa 
is sincere. This will enhance the gains already made by the international 
assistance already extended to the Commission, mainly from the 
European Community and the DN Voluntary Fund for Advisory 
Services. 12 
Finally, from its beginning, a weakness of the Commission has been the 
lack of activist conviction of its members, especially, the initial 
Commissioners, since members of the Commission were not interested in 
judicial . activism aimed at developing the jurisprudence of the 
Commission. Despite the evasive nature of the mandate of the 
Commission in the Charter, there are ample provisions upon which the 
Commission can rely to serve the purposes of human rights protection . 
and even enforcement. Since the Commission has the mandate of 
drawing up its rules of procedure,13 it could use that measure to assert 
some level of independence in construing the Charter. 
The Commission also has the power under article 45(1)b to formulate 
principles and rules aimed at the solution of legal problems relating to 
human rights and fundamental freedom upon which the African 
Governments may base legislation. Article 60 gives the Commission the 
power to draW "inspiration from international laws ... " while Article 61 
allows it "to take into consideration, as subsidiary measures to determine 
12. See Welch, supra note 8, at 54. It is estimated that each of these bodies has committed 
approximately $200,000 to the purse of the Commission. 
13. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 42(2). 
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the principles of law, other general or special international conventions, 
laying down rules expressly recognized by member states of the 
Organization of African Unity, African practices consistent with 
international norms on human rights, customs generally accepted as law, 
general principles of law recognized by African states as well as 
jurisprudence and legal doctrine." The combined effect of these 
provisions, it can be argued, is the power to apply international standards 
in Commission deliberations. Thus, the Commission could use 
innovation to realize what it was expressly or impliedly denied in the 
Charter. 
Critics of the Commission argue that the Commissioners have been 
unwilling to use these windows of opportunity for a number of reasons, 
including their close relationships to the African states. 14 Many of the 
commissioners were or still are prominent officials in their states of 
ongm, which makes it difficult for such individuals to act 
independently. 15 
Recent activities of the commissioners, however, suggest the willingness 
of the Commission to be more progressive in interpreting the Charter and 
using its powers under it. The Commission now appears willing, for 
example, to circumvent the restrictive provisions of Rule 32 of its 
procedure endorsing in camera sittings and sessions of the 
Commission.16 Scholars of African Human Rights 17 note the following 
as reasons for the shift in practice: (1) the increased self-confidence the 
Commission has gained over time, (2) the growing number of qualified 
observers such as international non-governmental agencies, and (3) 
recognition of the need that the work of the Commission be understood 
and supported by the public in order to be effective. 
The Commission has also started trying to circumvent the confidentiality 
feature of the Charter under Article 59 which has brought the efficacy of 
14. Mutua, supra note 7, at 34 
15. Id., Examples of such membership in the Commission are two former Commissioners, 
Moleki D. Mokama and Alexis Gabou, who during their term of office on the Commission, also 
served as Attorney General and Minister of Interior of Botswana and Congo, respectively. See 
specifically, EVELYN A. ANKUMA, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEoPLES' RIGHTS: 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 18 (The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996). 
Infra note 18. 
16. In its ninth session in Lagos, Nigeria in March, 1991 the Commission allowed observers to 
view all meetings except those dealing with protection activities and the report to the OAU. The 
Commission has also recently undertaken visits to some member countries to review the human 
rights situation in those countries, the most recent being the visit by a delegation of the Commission 
to Nigeria, on the invitation of the government in March, 1996. 
17. Welch, supra note 8 at 54. 
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the Charter into question. In an attempt to publicize the Commission's 
activities, in 1991, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) attending 
the Commission's session and working with the Commission, established 
an NGO register under the supervision of the International Commission 
of Jurists. Under this system, individuals, NGOs, and others who have 
submitted complaints to the Commission are to record their complaints 
and any information received by the Commission on the status of the 
complaint in the register. IS This system, which is supposed to make the 
activities of the Commission accessible, regrettably has not been made 
much use of by many NGOS.19 The Commission also distributes its Final 
Communique, issued at the end of each Ordinary Session, as well as 
press releases and its Annual Activity Report, which becomes a public 
document after its adoption by the AHSG.2o 
While these attempts at publicity are commendable, the Commission still 
maintains a restrictive interpretation of the confidentiality provision of 
the Charter on its activities. The Commission does not publish the 
method by which it reaches its decisions on admissibility and the 
substantive rights in the Charter.21 In other words, apart from its Final 
Communique, press releases, Annual Activity Report and the "Review of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights", there is no 
publication of the deliberation and reasoned decision of cases by the 
Commission. 
Thus, it must be said that there is still a lack of full confidence on the 
part of the Commissioners to explore the Commission's hidden powers, 
as discussed earlier. There needs to be a major reformulation of the 
African Charter to incorporate express powers to the Commission in light 
of the needs of the human rights environment in Africa. There is no 
doubt that an express provision of law is better than implied authority, at 
least for the purpose of providing effective remedies. 
B. REMEDY UNDER THE CHARTER 
Even if the commission concludes that there has been a violation of 
rights, what effective remedy does the African Charter provide for? In 
18. EVELYN A. ANKUMA, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 39 (The Hague, The Netherlands: Maninus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996). 
19. Id. 
20. Id. The Seventh Activity Report of the Commission, considered by the ASHG at its 30th 
session in Tunis in 1994 and published by the OAU, went a step further in disclosing the status of 
the cases submitted to the Commission. 
21. Id. at 77. 
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fact, the Charter does not offer significant remedies. Article 58 of the 
Charter provides: 
(1) When it appears after deliberations of the Commission that 
one or more exceptional situations apparently reveal the exis-
tence of a series of serious or massive violations of human and 
Peoples' rights, the Commission shall draw the attention of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government to them. 
(2) The Assembly of Heads of State and Government may then 
request the Commission to undertake an in-depth study of these 
situations and make a factual report, accompanied by its findings 
and recommendations. 
(3) A case of emergency duly noticed by the Commission shall 
be submitted by the latter to the Chairman of the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government who may request in-depth study. 
One must agree with Wolfgang22 on his comment about these provisions. 
According to him, there is a distinction between the remedy available in 
ordinary cases of violations and special cases of violations. He opines 
that while there appears to be a remedy in special cases, there is no 
remedy in ordinary cases of violation. Special cases are those involving 
the existence of serious or massive violations of human and Peoples' 
rights. Thus, whether a remedy is available or not is dependent on 
whether the act complained of is a serious and massive violation of 
human rights or requires emergency action, or is an ordinary abuse of 
human rights. The remedy, whether there is an ordinary abuse or a 
special or emergency case, is in-depth study after the Commission either 
makes factual reports to the AHSG or draws the AHSG's attention to 
them. 
What remedy, if any, does in-depth study or recommendation provide? 
The Assembly of Heads of States and Governments is not a body that is 
in session all year round, nor does the Commission have the power to 
summon such assembly. The AHSG has not been known to order an in-
depth study as suggested by Article 58. Indeed, the AHSG has been 
known to be strongly guided by the OAU's objective of non-intervention 
in member countries' internal affairs, which has been the organization's 
attitude towards human rights violations by its members. As a result, the 
22. Wolfang, supra note 9, at 31. 
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Charter remedy is ineffective and there is in fact, no remedy within the 
Charter. A former Chairman of the Commission summed up the 
situation thus: 
The enforcement procedure is unsatisfactory. In the absence of a 
court and effective measures to a breach, the Charter may well 
be a paper tiger except for public opinion that may be whipped 
up against the offender. The Commission may investigate, dis-
cuss and make recommendations to the states concerned. Do 
these include the award of damages, restoration or reparation? 
The Assembly can only ask the commission to make in-depth 
studies. The Charter does not state that it can condemn an of-
fending state.23 
This obvious inherent lack of effective remedy in the African human 
rights mechanism should be corrected by . amending the Charter to 
provide for a court without the Commission's limitations and to align 
new roles to be performed by the Commission with those to be 
performed by the court. 
III. THE NEED FOR A COURT 
Critics of the proposition that the African mechanism needs a court often 
argue that the idea of a court is not in keeping with traditional Mrican 
ways of dispute resolution. They maintain that mediation and 
conciliation are the proper avenues, as mechanisms rooted in African 
tradition.24 The tenability of that argument today remains to be judged 
by the realities of present day Africa in light of the ineffectiveness of the 
present mechanism under the Charter. Why should traditional African 
considerations prevail in the area of human rights? Domestic legal 
institutions are not modeled on traditional African ways of dispute 
resolution; rather, they duplicate the various legal systems of Africa's 
colonial past. According to Dieng,25 "the delights of traditional 
anthropology should not lull us to the point of obscuring reality. Today, 
the time has come to accede to the demands of Africans who feel it 
23. U.O. MOZURIKE, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON.HUMAN AND PEoPLES' RIGHTS, Nigerian 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 25 (1992). 
24. Dieng, supra note 6, at 4. 
25. /d. 
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indispensable for the victims of human rights violations, or their 
representatives, to have recourse to judicial process on demand."26 
Apart from the traditional African mode of settling disputed questions, 
critics may also have another objection, a fear which is common to all 
other international mechanisms; that that the values of one legal system 
would dominate the court to the subordination or exclusion of other 
values.27 This objection, juridical in nature, has become irrelevant, since 
a regional court, like other international mechanisms, would apply 
principles of international law, which are based on international customs, 
rather than any particular body of common or civillaw.28 International 
law, it has been agreed, involves an amalgam of commonly held values 
of all nations, rather than a reflection of the values of anyone particular 
legal system or philosophy?9 
Another objection that has always been an issue in international law is 
that any international mechanism like a court of human rights infringes 
upon the national sovereignty of member states.30 Scholars have argued 
that one way to remove this fear from members is to provide for an 
optional clause similar to article 36 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ)?' Alternatively, two bases of jurisdiction, 
compulsory and advisory, have been suggested in order to attract general 
membership to an international mechanism. 
While it is desirable to attract many state members to an international or 
regional mechanism, it should be noted that human rights law should 
supersede the notion of national sovereignty?2 Individuals are the 
beneficiaries of international human rights law and thus, must be 
shielded from abuses of national sovereignty. States must accept that 
human rights law is inherently a limit on the scope of state action. For 
example, one cannot torture people as a matter of state policy any more 
than one can wage aggressive war. In modem international law, 
sovereignty does not confer the right to do either. The opinion of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in one of its advisory opinions 
26. /d. 
27. Nanette Dumas, Enforcement of Human Rights Standards: An International Human Rights 
Court and Other Proposals, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. Rev. 592 (1990). 
28. [d. 
29. [d. 
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on the real nature of human rights instruments is persuasive. According 
to the court: 
[M]odern human rights treaties in general, and the American 
Convention in particular, are not multilateral treaties of the tra-
ditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of 
rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting states. Their ob-
ject and purpose is the protection of the basic rights of individual 
human beings, irrespective of their nationality, both against the 
state of their nationality and all other contracting States. In con-
cluding these human rights treaties, the States can be deemed to 
submit themselves to a legal order within which they, for the 
common good, assume various obligations, not in relation to 
other states, but toward all individuals within their jurisdiction 33 
The above quote indicates the importance of the individual in human 
rights jurisprudence even though individuals are not per se subjects of 
international law. It is even arguable that human rights treaties make 
them subjects of international law. 
Some scholars of African Human Rights have concluded that a weak 
enforcement machinery such as the African Commission was all that was 
feasible at the time of the adoption of the African Charter, and would 
have made the establishment of a court premature at. that time. 
Subsequent establishment of a court would therefore depend on how the 
initial organ functioned?4 
The current situation in Africa indicates the need for such a court. One 
basic question that may arise is whether African states are ready to 
cooperate in establishing a court of human rights. That readiness is can 
be gleaned from the resolution of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Governmene5 during the Summit of the OAU in Tunis in June 1994, in 
which the Secretary General of the organization was called upon to 
summon experts to meet on the establishment of an African Court of 
Human Rights. Further, the wind of democratization is blowing across 
Africa; and the fall of apartheid in South Africa poses a great challenge 
33. Inter-Am. C.H.R, Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, Ser. A, No.2, 29 (1982). This opinion is 
based on the effect of reservations on entry into force of the American Convention. 
34. EZE C. OSIT A, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: SOME SELECfED PROBLEMS, The Nigerian 
Institute of International Affairs in co-operation with Macmillan Nigeria Publishers Ud. 226 (1984). 
35. Resolution AHG/230(XXX) June 1994. Supra note 4. 
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to African governments to emphasize social justice both at the domestic 
and regionalleve1.36 
The present realities of human rights in Africa today make the 
establishment of a court invaluable for the following reasons: 
First, the protection of human rights under the African Charter and its 
institution has not been effectively realized, and will continue as such if 
nothing is done. The African Commission as presently structured and 
mandated is merely a committee making recommendations to the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of 
African Unity, which holds the ultimate word. This procedure has 
already subjected the human rights situation in Africa to subjective 
political considerations, and has inevitably weakened the position of the 
only organ meant for protection functions?7 A sincere effort at 
eradicating the shortcomings of the present mechanism will necessarily 
entail the establishment of a court, which in tum will involve a 
reformulation of the Charter. A question that may arise in this regard is 
whether solving the problem necessarily requires a court; whether a 
stronger Commission would not solve the problem. However, the basic 
issue here is enforcement, a power which may not easily be given to a 
commission by member states. Moreover, experience has shown even 
within the UN system that a commission does not possess the authority 
to issue a binding and enforceable decision. 
Second, the experience of other regional counterparts of the African 
system has shown that a court is necessary for the articulation of 
international legal principles at the regional level. An authoritative 
statement of this principles by a judicial organ is needed. These 
principles may be articulated either in the court's exercise of compulsory 
jurisdiction, or in jurisdiction of an advisory nature. 38 This will 
necessarily lead to uniformity in the definition of international human 
36. Mandela's South Africa, together with the International Commission of Jurists, is in the 
forefront of this new crusade for the addition of a judicial organ to the present African Mechanism. 
37. For a detailed discussion of this proposition, see N.S. REMBE, THE SYSTEM OF 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: 
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, Institute of Southern African Studies, National University of Lesotho 1 
(1991). 
38. It could be said that the Inter-American Court achieved its major success in the human 
rights situations of Central and Southern American countries from the articulation of international 
legal principles under the appropriate instruments primarily by way of advisory opinions. The same 
can be said of the International Court of Justice (ICI) and the European Court of Human Rights. A 
court in the traditional sense is required to properly articulate and enforce a legal principle, 
especially in international law; and particularly in human rights law. 
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rights obligations assumed by member states, which in tum will lead to 
development of standards in the region concerning other issues that will 
come before the court. Such uniformity would create a system fair to 
both the defending state parties and the victims, rather than permit 
human rights violators to go unpunished39 as in the present mechanism. 
Third, human rights enforcement is likely to be more easily realized with 
the establishment of a court than in the present situation. A case coming 
before the court will entail publicity, not the confidentiality and secrecy 
of the present system. Even where a decision of a court is an advisory 
opinion and therefore not binding, it usually attracts far-reaching 
pUblicity and promotes compliance~ States are known to have complied 
with advisory decisions, either in ending violations of human rights or 
adopting laws that follow the opinion of the court.40 In human rights 
law, adverse publicity serves as a form of sanction.41 Condemnation of a 
state action by a regional court attaches a serious obligation to state 
party, and is therefore more effective in commanding the respect of that 
state. Also, domestic courts, especially courts with common law 
traditions in Africa, will look to a human rights court for direction and 
precedents in their application of human rights instruments at the 
domestic level. 42 
Fourth and finally, as a regional human rights organ, a court can be an 
important instrument in sustaining constitutional democracies and 
facilitating the fuifilllment of human rights which are now universally 
recognized.43 Domestic systems ought to be committed to basic values 
of the modem international movement such as democracy, humane 
government; and the fulfillment of the basic human rights established by 
the international system44 but are oftentimes times guaranteed by 
domestic constitutions without assurance of protection. A court would 
therefore serve as an external check to ensure that democracies follow 
the rules. 
39. Dumas, supra note 27. at 585. 
40. This has been particularly true in the case of the Inter-American system, where the 
exercise of the court's advisory jurisdiction set the ground for enunciating doctrinal principles in 
international human rights law as it affects the Americas. For more detail on the advisory jurisdiction 
of the Inter-American Court, see Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American 
Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. I (1985). 
41. REMBE, supra note 37, at 39. 
42. Registered Trustees of the Constitutional Rights Projects v. The President of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria and 2 Others, 3 J. HUM. RTS. L. PRAC. 217 (1993). 
43. W. Michael Resiman, Practical Matters For Consideration In The Establishment Of a 
Regional Human Rights Mechanism: Lessons From The Inter-American Experience, ST. LoUIS-
WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC LJ. 89 at 100 (1995). 
44. Id. 
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N. STRUCTURING THE COURT 
A. COMPOSITION 
Establishing an African Court of Human Rights would requlfe a 
composition that takes into account African geography and legal 
traditions. The two basic legal traditions in Africa are the common and 
civil law traditions.45 Geographical considerations should take 
cognizance of proportionate representation of African states based on 
regions. Consideration of the population density of countries in the 
various regions will prove useful in this regard. 
The generally accepted regional divisions of Africa include Northern 
Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa, Eastern Africa, Western Africa, 
and the Islands. There is a greater concentration of countries in the west, 
a lesser concentration in the Islands, and a relatively equal concentration 
of countries in the other regional divisions. Composing a court based on 
population density will also contribute to balancing of legal traditions, 
since all the regions tend to have countries with legal systems based on 
the common and civil law traditions. The reason for regional rather than 
state representation on the court is clear, both for economic and practical 
reasons.46 
If composition based on regional representation is acceptable, numerical 
representation by region should then be determined. This paper proposes 
that the court be composed of thirteen judges, two representing each 
region of the Northern, Central, Southern, and Eastern divides, with the 
Western region represented by three judges, and the Island region by 
one.47 This mode of allocation takes cognizance of the number of 
countries that compose the regions. While the west has the largest 
45. It should be noted, however, that the notion of personal law is growing to be another legal 
tradition in Africa. This class includes customary law, or native law and custom which has become 
an integral part of African legal tradition. Sharia law, for instance, is seen as personal law; thus, it is 
customary law in areas where common law and civil law are predominant. On the other hand, there 
are Islamic States in Africa, where Sharia is the main or major legal tradition. Sharia is believed to 
be God's law for the Islamic community, indeed, for all human kind. See JOHN L. ESPOSITO, IsLAM: 
THE STRAIGHT PATH 88 (Oxford University Press, 1990.) See also S.G. VESEY-FITZGERALD, 
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE SHARIA IN LAw IN THE MIDDLE EAST 85 (Magidd Khadim and 
Herbert J. Libesny, eds., 1955.) 
46. Compare this situation with the European mechanism, where each state party is 
represented in the European Court of Human Rights through the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Africa is made up of fifty three countries. It would generally be impractical to begin a court 
with fifty three members. 
47. This proposal would be subject to negotiation by member states. While negotiation on 
numerical representation may be difficult, it would be reasonable for member states to consider the 
concentration of countries in the various regions. 
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concentration of countries, the Islands have the smallest concentration. 
Further, the composition of thirteen judges would offer the court a good 
selection of judges from across the African continent.48 
The court should consist of persons of the highest moral integrity who 
have shown demonstrated interest and commitment in the field of human 
rights, and with wide-ranging experience and qualifications.49 This 
would ordinarily include qualified lawyers, judges, scholars and 
juriconsults. It has been argued that one need not be a lawyer to be 
acquainted with human rights, and thus, non-lawyers could be members 
of a human rights court. While this may be true, being a member of a 
court necessarily involves the articulation of legal principles, which 
could be said to be the exclusive preserve of lawyers. It does not follow, 
however, that all lawyers are necessarily knowledgeable in human rights 
law. 
Member countries should ordinarillo make the nominations of who 
should compose the court by way of appointment,5l while actual election 
should be JIndertaken by the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the OAU.52 Wa Mutua53 is of the view that members of 
the court should be proposed by the African Bar Association together 
48. Note that under Article 10 of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, there is a provision to the effect that the court shall consist of eleven judges. Under 
Article 11 of the said Protocol, the composition is explained as emphasizing representation of all 
regions of Africa and also, adequate representation of women in the court in relation to men. 
49.· This is the usual qualification required of judges and other members of international 
human rights tribunals or quasi-judicial organs. See specifically American Convention on Human 
Rights, art. 52 (1). Compare European Convention on Human Rights, art. 38; and Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, art. 28(2) dealing with the qualification of the members of the Inter-American 
Commission, the European Commission and the UN Human Rights Committee respectively. 
50. It may be stressed that states may not always nominate members of a regional or 
international tribunal. The approach taken under the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), which uses groups of independent experts to make nominations of members of the court,may 
as well serve as a mode of appointing members of the proposed African Court. This mode, it is 
argued, may lessen the prospect of nominating poorly qualified persons as political favors. See 
Mutua, supra note 7. on his proposal of using the African Bar Association and other national Bars to 
make nomination to the African Court. 
See specifically Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 4 which provides that members 
of the ICJ shall be elected by the UN General Assembly and by the Security Council from a list of 
persons nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration ... or by national 
groups appointed for that purpose by governments, members of the UN not represented in the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
51. Representing the countries in this case will imply country of origin rather than representing 
the interest of the country in question since the members of the court are supposed to serve in their 
indi vidual and personal capacities. 
52. See Proposed Draft Protocol on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, art. II, 12, and 13 [hereinafter Draft Protocol]. 
53. Mutua, supra note 7, at 34. 
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with the national bar association of the country from which the 
candidates originated. This author believes that one of the reasons 
behind this view is the need for the court to be an impartial body; a body 
without the slightest influence from their home governments. Another 
reason is to enhance individuality of each judge to the court. It is 
actually desirable to have an independent body with input by the bar of 
African countries. It needs to be stated, however, that the political 
realities of the situation will require states to be given the opportunity to 
nominate candidates, provided the candidates possess the requisite 
qualifications and the commitment to break new ground in human rights 
enforcement in Africa. States will be very unwilling to relinquish this 
function to bar associations at least at the early stages. 
B. BASIC FRAMEWORK 
Scholars of African human rights systems have on many occasions 
lamented the non-existence of an African Court on Human Rights as 
compounding the problem of human rights enforcement in Africa. They 
recommend such a court. However, none has suggested any structural 
framework. A guess would be that they envisage that the structure of an 
African Court of Human Rights should be drawn from such existing 
mechanisms in Europe and the Americas and the International Court of 
Justice. Indeed, the structure of an African Court should be inspired by 
these forerunner institutions, provided the special needs of the African 
continent are taken into consideration. 54 Accordingly, the structure to be 
developed should be able to withstand the test of time. In other words, 
the structure, while focusing on the present, should envisage the volume 
of work that the court will have to face in the future, and should aim at 
establishing a permanent court as an institution. 
The following basic structure should be put in place by way of an 
amendment such as the Draft Protocol: 
First, with the election of the judges by member states of the OAU 
assembled, the judges should be able to elect the officers of the court, 
namely, the president and vice president,55 whose duties as well as other 
54. The drafters of the Draft Protocol on the African Court for Human and Peoples' Rights 
give credence to the fact of drawing inspiration from existing regional and international systems in 
the Explanatory Notes to the Draft Protocol. 
55. See Draft Protocol, art. 18. Compare African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 
42(1) with respect to members of the African Commission; Statute of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, art. 12(1); and European Convention on Human Rights, art. 41. 
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requirements should be spelled out by the rules of the court which would 
be made by the court, as in other regional practices. 56 
Second, the functional structure of the court would require a plenary 
court and chambers as the need arises. Article 20 of the Draft Protocol 
provides for a quorum of seven judges for the court based on its 
provision for eleven judges as members of the court; and requires the 
establishment of two chambers of five Judges each "if the need arises." It 
might be necessary that a separate provision be made in the Protocol for 
the establishment of chambers, unless it is envisaged to be a matter 
directly within the competence of the court to deal with in its rulemaking 
power. 57 In this author's opinion, the two chambers should consist of 
five judges each, and judges of the various chambers should be allowed 
to rotate based on the number of judges proposed in the composition 
subsection above. 
When the court is fully established, the majority of cases should be 
decided by the various chambers. The plenary court would be invested 
with the power of deciding cases of great importance to the 
establishment or restatement of important principles of international 
human rights law and the interpretation of the African Charter as it 
affects the domestic law of member states, or where the court sees it 
necessary to overrule itself and depart from its earlier decision. 58 
The importance of this procedure cannot be overemphasized. It will 
afford a greater sense of direction to domestic courts as to how to apply 
their own law, especially for legal traditions that place precedential 
emphasis on the decision of a higher court. Further, the plenary court 
couldhelp to shape development of the entire system and gain the 
confidence of member states, who may ordinarily be reluctant to 
recognize the jurisdiction of limited panels of the court. 
56. See Article 42 (2) of the African Charter; Article 22 of the Draft Protocol on the African 
Charter; Article 55 of the European Convention; and Article 60 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights. 
57. Article 26 of Protocol!! refonning the European System specifically provides, inter alia, 
that the new court shall sit in chambers. However, it appears that under the Statute of the UN 
\ Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the issue of chambers was left to the court to organize as the 
need arose. This author is of the view that specifically providing for the chambers in the protocol is 
preferable to leaving it to the discretion of the court. 
58. Under Rule 15 of the Rules of the European Court of Human Rights, a chamber of the 
court has discretion to relinquish jurisdiction to the plenary court if a case raises serious issues of 
interpretation of the Convention, but must relinquish such jurisdiction in the event of a possible 
departure from previous case law. Note that under the new Protocol 11, some of the jurisdiction with 
respect to certain matters of the present Plenary Court will be exercised by the new Grand Chamber, 
while the new Plenary Court will be involved with administrative matters. 
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Third, the court will require a registry or secretariat that will carry out the 
administrative aspects of the court's functions. The functions of the 
registry will necessarily involve preparing cases, having the relevant 
official attend the court's deliberations, and drafting judgments in light 
of the deliberations. The registrar should ordinarily be appointed by the 
court and not by a political body like the OAU acting through its 
secretary general.59 This is one area where the independence of the court 
should be emphasized. With respect to the proposed court, Draft Article 
21 (1) of the Draft Protocol tried to correct the defect noticed in the 
Charter with regard to the Commission by vesting the court with the 
power to appoint its own registrar. 
There is no disputing the fact that the registry of the court, like the 
secretariat of the Commission, will be dependent upon the OAU for its 
budget. The registrar need not be an outsider to the OAU system; rather, 
the court should appoint whom it will, including prospective applicants 
from the OAU Secretariat. This is essential as a way of emphasizing the 
court's independence. Its registry, including the secretariat of the 
Commission, should not have the status of an administrative unit of the 
OAU.60 In the case of the present European system, one of the main 
reasons why the European Court is vested with the power of appointing 
its registrar is that subjecting the registry of the court to the oversight of 
the of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe would involve a 
political chain of command that would be incompatible with the court's 
judicial independence, especially as the registry plays a vital role in the 
judicial work of the court.61 
59. For example, with respect to the Secretary of the African Commission, Article 41 of the 
African Charter provides that the Secretary General of the OAD shall appoint the Secretary of the 
Commission and that he shall provide the staff and the services necessary for the effective discharge 
of the duties of the Commission. In the case of the UN Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, it is true 
that the UN Secretary General makes the appointment of the Registrar under Article 13 of the Statute 
of the Tribunal. That appointment, however, is in consultation with the President of the Tribunal, 
who in tum seeks the opinion of the judges. It was the intention of the drafters of the statute to give 
the Tribunal a say in the appointment of the Registrar which enhances the independence of the 
Tribunal. 
60. See Rule Aeneid 12 of the Rules of the European Court under which the Court elects the 
Registrar of its registry for a renewable term of seven years, as well as the Deputy Registrar. The 
other officials of the Council of Europe are appointed by the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe with the agreement of the President of the Court or Registrar as provided by rule 13. See also 
Rule 7(2) of the Rules of the Inter-American court on the election of the Secretary of the Court's 
secretariat. 
61. MAHONEY AND PREBENSEN, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, in THE 
EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 620 
(MacDonald et aI., eds., 1993). 
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In the European system the registrar is regarded as a member of the 
court.62 This should be duplicated in the African Court in view of the 
roles that will be proposed for the court in this paper with regard to the 
court's relationship with the existing African Commission. Thus, the 
basic framework to be given the court at the beginning should be such 
that will enhance the court's independence. 
C. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMMISSION 
The establishment of an African Court of Human Rights will definitely 
impact the work of the present Commission, and requires clarification of 
the functions each of the bodies will perform in the proposed new 
mechanism. In this author's view, there are four possible scenarios under 
which this relationship can exist. _ 
The first scenario is similar to the present practice of the Inter-American 
system,63 where only a Commission or a member state may present a 
case to the court after the Commission completes its consideration of a 
petition in accordance with the procedural requirements of the American 
Convention.64 This procedure, it has been argued,65 portends delay, 
which may result in a denial of justice to victims of human rights abuse. 
It is strongly argued that governments accused of human rights abuses be 
given time to respond to complaints filed against them, and at the same 
time be free to refer a case to the Court if they are dissatisfied with the 
proceedings before the Commission.66 
Yet individuals, as beneficiaries of international human rights law, have 
no standing before the court in their own right. Thus, an individual has 
no recourse if dissatisfied with the Commission's decision or if the 
government fails to comply with the Commission's recommendations.67 
While an individual is given standing before the Commission, he or she 
62. Id. 
63. For a detailed discussion of the Inter-American System, see T. BUERGENTHAL AND DINAH 
SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: CASES AND MATERIALS, Revised 4th 
Edition (Strasbourg, France: International Institute of Human Rights 1995). See also Dinah Shelton, 
The Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Coun of Human Rights, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 
333 (1994); and Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights System: Establishing 
Precedents and Procedure in Human Rights Law, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 297 (1995). 
64. See the Inter-American Court Decision in the Viviana Gallardo Case of Nov. 13 1981; 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 12, OENSer. A and B No. 0.101181 (1982) where the Court refused a case 
submitted by Costa Rica because it was not filed and considered first by the Commission. 
65. See Pasqualucci, supra note 63, at 309. 
66. Id. 
67. /d. at 316. 
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is denied access to the court. There needs to be a complete and 
reasonable access given to individuals.68 
With respect to an African System, the criticism of the Inter-American 
system described above would apply equally, particularly as to individual 
standing before the court. Modern human rights law principles, as 
developed by the Inter-American and European systems, show that there 
is a great need for individuals to have direct access to a human rights 
Court. Advocating individual standing before the court is not endorsing 
an unrestricted access to every case or potential case. 
The second scenario is the one envisaged in the Draft Protocol to the 
African Charter. Article 2 of the Draft Protocol, dealing with the 
relationship between the Court and the Commission, provides that "the 
Court shall complement the protective mandate of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Conferred upon it by the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights." Draft Article 5 (1) 
provides that the Commission, a state party which has lodged a 
complaint to the Commission, and a state party against which the 
complaint has been lodged at the Commission will have the power to 
submit a case to the court. Article 5(2) goes on to provide that when a 
state party has a legal interest in a case, it may submit a request to the 
court to be permitted to join. Article 7, however, provides for an 
additional exceptional jurisdiction: 
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 5, the Court may 
on exceptional grounds, allow individuals, non-governmental 
organizations and groups of individuals to bring cases before the 
Court without flrst proceeding under Article 55 of the Charter.69 
(2) The Court will consider such a case, taking into account the 
conditions enunciated in Article 56 of the Charter. 
68. It may be true that leaving control of the "courthouse door" to the Commission and 
governments under the Inter-American system limits the number of cases and allows judicial 
resources to be used efficiently. However, it should be stressed that while gate keeping of the 
courthouse door is important, it may exclude individuals with meritorious cases, and may some 
times be used as a political tool. 
69. Article 55(1) & (2) of the African Charter provides that the Secretary of the Commission at 
each session shall make a list of communications referred to in Article 56 and transmit them to 
members of the Commission, who may read them and submit them to the Commission. Such 
communications shall be submitted to the Commission at the request of the simple majority of its 
members. It should be noted that the communications referred to here, whose contents and 
conditions are explained in Article 56 are those by individuals or organizations rather than states. 
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(3) The Court itself may consider the case or refer it to the 
Commission. 
The combined effect of draft Articles 5 and 7 is that while state parties 
and the African Commission have direct access to the court, in 
exceptional circumstances individuals, groups of persons, and non-
government organizations may also go directly to the court without 
passing though the commission. Presumably, the court would interpret 
the meaning of exceptional circumstances, in which case it may decide 
the matter or order that the Commission to consider the matter flrst. This 
procedure would need further elaboration as to how it will work. 70 
Under this scenario, as one would have expected, there is no drastic 
change in the relationship between the African Commission and the 
proposed court. It simply modifles the first scenario based on the Inter-
American System by granting individual standing before the proposed 
court in exceptional circumstances. Unless there are such exceptional 
circumstances, the situation remains the same as under the Inter-
American system.71 It seems likely that the interpretation of exceptional 
grounds will be quite narrow, which will not make this procedure a 
popular one. Since human rights violations in African Countries are 
rampant, an individual should not be to a finding of exceptional 
circumstances before he or she is given standing before the court. 
The third scenario would involve the adoption of a procedure similar to 
the one under Protocol 9 to the European Convention which introduced 
individual standing before the European court.72 This procedure requires 
a screening panel of three members of the Court in a case referred by an 
individual. This panel determines whether the case raises a serious 
70. This is due to the fact that in their explanation the drafters of the Protocol did not state the 
details of the dynamics of Article 7. It merely states standing has been granted to individuals and 
, international organizations in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter. It may well be 
that the court will work it out procedurally in its rules. 
71. Note that draft Article 8(2) & (3) of the draft protocol provides that the court will not 
consider a matter involving inter-state communication (Article 49 of the Charter) or communications 
by individuals or groups (not amounting to exceptional grounds - normal article 55 of the Charter' 
provision) until the proceedings before the Commission have been considered and a report prepared 
or a decision is made as to each case. This it can be argued is a codification of the rule in the Inter-
American case of Viviana Gallardo, supra note 64, which has been criticized by Pasqualucci. See 
Pasqualucci, supra note 63, 309-317. 
72. Protocol 9 to the European Convention amends Article 48 of the Convention by providing, 
among other things, that the person, non-governmental organization, or group of individuals having 
lodged the complaint with the Commission may refer a case to the Court. Note that Protocol 9, 
which is optional, was adopted in 1990 and entered into force in 1994. As of 1995, it had been 
ratified by seventeen countries. 
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question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention. 
Where it does not, the panel may, by unanimous vote, decide that the 
case shall not be considered by the court,73 in which case it will be 
decided by the Committee of Ministers.74 Thus, the screening panel 
determines which cases proceed to the court. After the panel has 
completed its task, even in cases that it decides should proceed to the 
Court, the usual procedures in examining a case referred to the Court are 
followed. 75 
The procedure introduced by Protocol 9 appears to have influenced the 
inclusion of Article 7 of the draft Protocol to the African Charter. The 
only difference is that under the draft protocol the complaint need not be 
lodged with the African Commission before a person or group of persons 
can have standing before the court. The determination of exceptional 
grounds will most likely require the same standard as that vested in the 
screening panel under Protocol 9, mainly for purposes of controlling the 
volume of cases that eventually make it to the court. 
Protocol 9 has the shortcoming of not fully realizing that individuals 
have been granted standing before the court. It also fails to eliminate the 
inherent delay76 in a two-tiered system that does not appear to perform 
entirely different functions. These may be some of the reasons that the 
European System is undergoing an entire reform with the promulgation 
of Protocol 11,77 which eliminates the European Commission and 
establishes a Court of Human Rights as the only European Human Rights 
institution to deal with matters that were formerly dealt with by two 
institutions. 
The fourth scenario, which this author espouses, will result in significant 
reform of the African Human Rights Mechanism. It WIll entail adapting 
the object of the European Reform under its Protocol 11 to the African 
73. Article 5(2), second sub-paragraph. 
74. [d. 
75. See also, D. J. HARRIS ET AL., THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 659, 663 (London: Butterworth 1995). 
76. Under the European dual system it took, on average five years and six months (four years 
and four months before the Commission, 13 months before the Court) for a case to be decided in 
Strasbourg in 1992; in 1993 the average was five years and eight months (four years and four 
months before the Commission, one year and three months before the Court). For this and other 
characteristics of the new European System, see Andrew Drzemczewski and Meyer-Ladewig, 
Principal Characteristics of the New ECHR Control Mechanism as Established by Protocol no. 11 
Signed on 11 May 1994, 15 HUM. RTS LJ. 81 at 85 (1994). 
77. Protocol 11 is not yet in force. It was opened for signature as of May 11, 1994. According 
to its Article 4 the Protocol shall enter into force one year after ail parties to the European 
Convention have either ratified accepted or approved the Protocol. 
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mechanism, while still retaining the African Commission. It will require 
assigning distinct functions to the Commission and the Court based on 
the need of Africans. Under this framework, the proposed court would 
assume a great deal of human rights protection and enforcement, while 
the Commission would assume full responsibility for human rights 
promotion and negligible aspects of protection. The court should take 
over the communication functions of the Commission as well as 
maintaining its own adjudicatory functions. Cases should be filed 
directly with the Court, whether by individuals, states, or organizations. 
The new European mechanism is particularly instructive in the actual 
organization of its proposed framework. As in the proposed European 
Protocol 11, the proposed African court's registry will communicate with 
petitioners and, where necessary, request additional information from the 
parties, with the aim of eliminating obviously inadmissible, hopeless and 
frivolous applications at the early stage of the proceedings. Where it is 
established that a petition makes out a prima facie case, it would be 
registered and heard by a chamber. Before the case goes to the chamber, 
it should be considered by a screening committee made up of judges, 
which should include a judge rapporteur designated for that particular 
case. The committee determines whether a petition is admissible 
Where a petition is declared inadmissible, the petition is terminated. On 
the other hand, a petition that is declared admissible proceeds to a 
chamber for consideration on the merits or further questions of 
admissibility. The judge rapporteur would normally prepare the case 
files and communicate with the parties regarding the procedures. The 
chamber should be able to explore and facilitate friendly settlement if 
possible, in which case, it sends the case to the Commission to initiate 
and follow up on friendly settlemenes within a specified time. Where no 
friendly settlement occurs, the chamber proceeds to render a judgment 
which could be referred to the plenary court in exceptional circumstances 
that raise serious questions on principles affecting the interpretation and 
application of the Charter.79 The plenary court should be in a position to 
determine which cases it will accept, which in tum will depend on the 
78. This is one area in which the procedure in the proposed African Court will differ from the 
European Protocol 11 procedure. Under Protocol 11, exploring and initiating friendly settlement is 
the responsibility of the chamber considering the case. Under the African proposal, the Commission 
could be involved in protective functions to maintain the sense of neutrality and balance that every 
petition requires. 
79. The Plenary Court under the proposed African system will combine the power of the 
Grand Chamber and the Plenary Court under the European Protocol 11 procedures. 
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serious issues of international human rights law involved in the case, and 
the need to establish precedent. 
The procedure highlighted above should be able to ensure proper 
gatekeeping with regard to control of cases that go before the proposed 
African Court of Human Rights. In light of the number of petitions that 
will come before the court, proper gatekeeping is a genuine concern. 
With the African court squarely involved with human rights 
enforcement, the African Commission should be able to settle down to 
the more traditional work of human rights promotion in its entirety as 
envisaged under the Charter, in addition to receiving and considering 
state reports. Here the Commission could embark on fact-finding 
missions, engage in country studies, issue country reports,80 organize 
conferences and seminars, and develop regional human rights 
scholarship. 
An additional area for the Commission would be advising member states 
on aspects of economic, social, cultural, and Peoples' rights that may not 
be immediately justiciable, in which the court may not be vested with 
subject matter jurisdiction in its adjudicatory functions. The 
Commission should be able to draw from the work of the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in determining the obligations 
of member states as they affect the economic, social, cultural and 
Peoples' rights provisions of the African Charter. These aspects of the 
Charter have received little or no attention in the work of the 
Commission.8! This added function presupposes that states will 
cooperate in their periodic reports to give detailed coverage of all aspects 
of the Charter's provisions.82 
The reason for proposing distinct functions for the Commission and the 
Court is clear. There is an increase in human rights violations in Africa 
for which victims need redress in the form of a court. It is also true that 
human rights promotion in Africa has a long way to go. An increase in 
80. The American Commission achieved a great deal for human rights in the Americas 
through its issuance of country reports. It also enabled the Organization of American States to take 
resolutions regarding human rights situations in those countries. 
81. The Commission would do well to issue general comments and recommendations in these 
areas, as did the UN Committee. It is possible that the recommendation of the Commission in this 
regard could lead to progressive development in these areas as envisaged by the Charter. 
82. The African Commission has recently introduced the practice of calling upon individual 
states to submit their periodic reports in final communiques issued by the Commission; previously, 
the communiques had simply made a general call on states which had not yet submitted their reports. 
See ANKUMA, supra note 18, at 76 
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human rights promotion, along with protection and enforcement by 
distinct institutions, will no doubt be a more efficient way of addressing 
the human rights situation in Africa. 
It could be said that this framework is very ambitious and may not enjoy 
popularity with African States in terms of resources and cooperation. 
Yet if reform of the African mechanism is necessary, it should be a 
proper reform, rather than reaching a compromise as was done under the 
Charter. Human rights and other non-governmental organizations need 
to embark on spirited lobbying and persuasion of African Governments 
and domestic institutions to ensure that an effective mechanism aimed at 
addressing the increasing human rights violations evolves in Africa. 
V. EMPOWERlNG THE COURT 
A. JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of an African Court of Human Rights would encompass 
both adjudicatory and advisory functions. The subject matter jurisdiction 
of the Court will have an impact on the court's adjudicatory and advisory 
functions. These aspects of the court need to be examined. 
l. Adjudicatory Jurisdiction 
This is usually referred to as the compulsory or ordinary jurisdiction of a 
human rights court or other international tribunal to determine 
contentious disputes that come before it on the merits. According to 
Judge Piza Escalante83 it is this form of jurisdiction that is likely to be 
relied ).lpon most frequently in guaranteeing the rights protected by a 
human rights instrument. The main object of a court's contentious 
jurisdiction is to rule on whether a state has violated any rights contained 
in a particular human rights instrument for which the victim seeks 
redress,84 in this case, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights. The exercise of this jurisdiction by the court will enable it to 
apply the instruments and issue a decision on the merits, which may 
include the award of reparations or other remedies where the court finds 
a violation. 
83. In his explanation to his dissenting vote in Viviana Gallardo, supra note 64, before the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
84. SCOTT DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 62 (Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Limited 1992). 
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In both the European and Inter-American Human Rights systems, 
member states may have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Courts by declaration. 85 Thus, the use of the courts' contentious 
jurisdiction in these systems is optional. Without acceptance of 
compulsory jurisdiction, courts cannot hear cases on the merits. The 
reasoning behind this practice was to reserve to states some measure of 
power based on the notion of sovereignty to decide whether to subject 
their actions to the review of an international body. 
The draft Protocol on the African Charter is silent on this point with 
regard to the proposed African Court. Its Article 3 provides that "the 
jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted 
to it concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, this 
Protocol and any other applicable African human rights instrument." The 
reason for this silence is deliberate in the sense that drafters of the 
Protocol intend that ratification of the Protocol by member states also 
amounts to acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.86 
Their decision may also have been influenced by the fact that the African 
Charter ,unlike the European Convention, did not make communications 
by individuals to the African Commission dependent on the optional 
acceptance of this procedure by member states. 
Critics of this provision who know the disposition of African states with 
respect to human rights may be of the view that this is too ambitious; that 
it would be better to have a declaration as to the optional recognition of 
the court's compulsory jurisdiction by member states to attract the 
requisite ratification that will make the Protocol go into force. On the 
other hand, it would appear that the drafters of the Protocol view the 
current reforms in regional human rights mechanisms, especially, the 
European mechanism, as an opportunity to have a solid human rights 
mechanism in Africa, the ratification of which will demonstrate some 
measure of seriousness and commitment by the ratifying states. 
85. See Articles 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 62(3) of the American 
Convention on Human Rights. The change introduced by Protocol 11 to the European Convention 
will eliminate this option when the Protocol comes into force. According to the provisions of the 
new Article 34 of the European Convention as amended by the Protocol, individual applications may 
be received by the court with the High Contracting Parties undertaking not to hinder in any way the 
effective exercise of this right by individuals. 
86. See the Explanation to the Draft Protocol on the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights at 2. 
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2. Advisory Jurisdiction 
The advisory jurisdiction of any international or regional tribunal 
involves a formal rendering of legal opinions on issues presented before 
it, even though those opinions have no binding legal effect in the form of 
requiring positive or negative action from the parties. Even though 
advisory opinions are not legally binding, the practice of the Inter-
American Court has shown that it can go a long way to affect the conduct 
of states with respect to human rights. The use of advisory opinions is 
particularly important in the sense that it may be the only way a court can 
have the benefit of looking into an issue involving a state not a party to 
the instrument vesting jurisdiction on the merits in the court. 
Drawing from the experience of the Inter-American system, this appears 
to be particularly important in the Mrican system.8? Article 4(1) of the 
Draft Protocol to the African Charter provides that "at the request of a 
member State of the OAU, any of its organs or any organization 
recognized by the OAU, the Court may provide an opinion on any legal 
matter relating to the Charter or other African human rights instruments." 
Subsection 2 gives a judge the freedom to render dissenting opinions. 
The practice of the Inter-American system whereby the Inter-American 
Court is regarded not just as a Convention organ, but also as an 
institution of the Organization of American States (OAS) in matters 
relating to human rights,88 will be highly instructive for proposed African 
reform. AS an OAU mechanism, the African Charter89 views member 
states as parties to the Charter. 
The exercise of advisory jurisdiction will also be highly relevant in those 
areas of the Charter where the question of justiciability as a result of the 
nature of the subject matter may be in doubt. The court may be able to 
articulate principles aimed at progressive development of the questions 
rmsed. . 
3. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
A probing question arises regarding the substantive rights that the 
proposed African court will apply in cases that come before it on the 
merits, in view of the fact that the African Charter contmns and 
87. For a detailed discussion, see Buergenthal, supra note 40, at L 
88. ld. 
89. See Article I of the Charter. See also Article 66, which provides for the enacting of special 
protocols and the like to supplement the provisions of the Charter. 
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guarantees a plethora of rights in the domain of traditional civil and 
political rights,90 as well as economic, social, and cultural rights.91 The 
Charter is also innovative in terms of Peoples' and other group rights.92 
The question is whether states will have the right to petition the court for 
individuals or group of individuals to perform their duties under the 
Charter. 
It appears that the framers of the draft Protocol did not address this issue 
with regard to the substantive rights jurisdiction of the proposed court. It 
could therefore be concluded that they foresee the application of the 
Charter as it is. For practical purposes, it is expedient for the Court to 
inquire into traditional civil and political rights and those aspects of 
economic, social, and cultural rights that could be said to be tangibly 
enforceable.93 Other rights not considered to be tangibly enforceable 
could form a substantial aspect of the Court's advisory jurisdiction. 
Some of these questions must come before the court before an 
appropriate interpretation as to the meaning of the Charter regarding 
them can be reached. A court would be equipped to give legal direction 
in this regard which could set a standard for other regional and 
international systems. As mentioned earlier, this could be an area in 
which the African Commission will be effective, especially in seeking 
advisory opinions of the Court on the actual meaning of and principles 
governing the realization of the economic, social, cultural, and Peoples' 
rights aspects of the Charter. 
It should be stated that this author believes that social and economic 
rights can be realized. They go a long way toward complementing civil 
and political rights. This is especially so in developing countries, where 
the need to for a conducive atmosphere to realize the basic necessities of 
life must be balanced with the need to realize civil liberties. However, 
the rampant corruption of the ruling class, whether military or civilian, 
especially in Africa in the face of needed economic, social, and cultural 
developments complicates the issues. 
B. INDEPENDENCE 
The functioning of a regional or international tribunal will require a great 
deal of independence in the exercise of its functions. The judges of such 
90. African Charter, art. 3-13. 
91. [d. art. 14-18. 
92. [d. art. 20-24. 
93. Such rights as property rights guaranteed under Article 14. 
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tribunals should have attained the professional and moral reputations 
required of judges of the highest court of their states of origin.94 It 
follows, therefore, that they should be taken seriously and allowed a free 
hand in their job. 
The Inter-American system and the European system recognize the 
importance of this independence in the various forms it takes. According 
to a commentator on the independence of the European Court in making 
its rules, "the court has astutely used this rule making competence, which 
serves to ensure its collective independence, to fill the gaps in the 
Convention.,,95 Further, judges are individually required to be 
independent of any influence from home governments or other entities.96 
This serves to emphasize the requirement that judges be selected on the 
basis of their individuality. 
Another form of independence is the granting of diplomatic immunity to 
the judges, as well as immunity from liability for any decisions or 
opinions issued in the exercise of their functions .. These principles will 
definitely benefit the proposed African system. Article 43 of the African 
Charter guarantees such immunity for members of the African 
Commission. 
The draft Protocol on the African Charter makes elaborate provision for 
the independence of judges of the proposed court. In Article 15, which 
also has a provision regarding immunity, it is expressly provided that the 
"Judges shall be independent in the exercise of their functions. The 
Court shall decide matters before it impartially, on the basis of fact and 
in accordance with law, without any restriction, undue influence, 
inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any 
quarter for any reason." This is a pretty strongly worded provision with 
an undertone that decries the manipulation that judicial decisions in 
Africa have been subjected to. 
An Mrican court of human rights needs a great deal of independence for 
effective enforcement of human rights. This guarantee of independence 
will evoke in the judges the zeal and activism needed to develop the law 
94. See Article 52(1) of the American Convention and Article 38 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. See also Article 31 of the African Charter regarding the qualification of the 
members of the Commission. 
95. Walter Ganshof van der Meersch, The European Coun of Human Rights, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, 193 (Installment 8,1985)" 
96. See Rule 4 of the Rules of the European Court. See also Article 71 of the American 
Convention. 
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in the region, and will ensure the effective exercise of the Court's power 
to order provisional measures in cases of extreme gravity and urgency as 
required in Article 25 of the draft Protocol. The Inter-American 
experience has shown that vesting a human rights court with the power 
of ordering provisional remedies can be highly effective.97 
C. ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 
As noted earlier in this paper, an area in which the present African 
mechanism falls short is in the enforcement of any decisions of the 
African Commission. It should be recalled that the decision of the 
Commission is not binding, nor is the Commission vested with the power 
to condemn any state action. Accordingly, states are not under any 
obligation to comply with the Commission's recommendations. It thus 
falls to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AHSG) of the 
OAU to decide the manner of enforcement.98 It is imperative that for an 
African court of human rights to serve its purpose, its decisions on the 
merits must be enforced, either by the states ruled against taking positive 
action to comply with the decision, or by vesting a body with fewer 
political ties in the region with the power to ensure that decisions of the 
court are complied with. 
In drafting the draft Protocol to the African Charter, its framers knew 
there was no effective enforcement mechanism in the Charter and tried to 
prevent it with regard to the Court. The draft Protocol provides for an 
enforcement mechanism that ranges from making the judgment of the 
Court final and not subject to appeal,99 to requiring state parties to 
comply with the court's judgment and guarantee its execution in any case 
to which they are a party.IOO Further, it provides for the transmission of 
the Court's judgment to other member states of the OAU and for the 
notification of Council of Ministers to monitor its execution on behalf of 
the AHSG.101 Finally, it provides for the Court to submit its reports to 
regular sessions of the Assembly, specifying cases in which a state has 
97. For a detailed analysis of how the Inter-American system has used its provisional measure 
power, see 10 M. Pasqualucci, Provisional Measures in the Inter-American Human Rights System: 
An Innovative Development in International Law, 26 V AND. 1. TRANSNAT'L L. 803 (1993). 
98. See Article 59 of the African Charter. The AHSG, as a political body whose member 
governments are the ones complained of, has not been known to have enforced any decision of the 
Commission. In addition, nothing in the Charter states that the decision of the Commission is 
binding on member states. 
99. African Charter, art. 26(4). 
100. Id. art. 27. 
10 1. Id. art. 28. 
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failed to comply with the Court's judgment. 102 These provisions borrow 
more heavily from the Inter-American system lO3 with regard to the 
process of the enforcement mechanism and take more from the European 
system on the use of Council of Ministers to monitor the execution of 
judgments. 104 
The drafters intended for a victim of a human rights abuse to enforce the 
compensation aspect of the judgment in a domestic court, vesting the 
Council of Ministers with the power to apply political pressure as well as 
taking strong measures against a. state to ensure compliance. If 
necessary, the AHSG can ultimately take the same measures. This 
framework for enforcement of a human rights system will go far to 
ensure the protection of human rights in the region even though, as has 
been observed in the European system,105 the Council of Ministers is a 
political body that may sometimes allow political considerations to 
interfere with its supervisory role. 
A problem that remains for Africa is the willingness of member states of 
the OAU to realize the "notorious" effect of a report of a state's 
noncompliance with the court's judgment, in view of the "sacred" 
objective of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states 
enshrined in the Charter of the OAU. On the other hand, it can be said 
that the realities of present-day Africa will make the enforcement 
framework go far. States now seem willing, no matter the cost, to 
publicly condemn human rights violations of member states.106 There is 
no doubt that a wind of change is blowing across Africa, fanned by the 
Continent's wish not to be left behind in the new world order of things, 
especially in the areas of human rights and democratization, which have 
increasingly become the basis of international relations. 
102. [d. art. 29. 
103. Compare Articles 26(4), 27, 28 and 29 of the draft Protocol with Articles 67, 68(1) and 69 
of the American Convention. 
104. Note that in the Inter-American system it is the General Assembly of the OAS that is 
vested with the power addressing non-compliance with a judgment of the Inter-American Court. For 
more details, see Davidson, supra note 84, at 88. Under the European Protocol 11, the Committee of 
Ministers retains its power of supervising the execution of the judgment of the European Court. 
105. MAHONEY AND PREBENSEN, supra note 61, at 636. 
106. Recently, Zambia publicly condemned the terrible human rights situation in Nigeria, 
notwithstanding the fact that Zambia paid the price for Nigeria's withdrawal of members of its 
Technical Aid Corps working in Zambia. 
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D. FUNDING 
It need not be emphasized that a regional human rights system must 
provide adequate funding for its enforcement organs if they are to be 
effective. Financing international and regional institutions is a huge 
issue, especially for an African institution. Member states are known not 
to respect their fmancial obligations to the parent regional organs which 
set the budgets for these human rights institutions. 107 The defense of 
many states opposed to the establishment of human rights institutions has 
always been the lack of resources to maintain these institutions. It is not 
in doubt that the work of a human rights court in Africa will require 
enormous financial resources. Staff lawyers must be hired to process and 
assist the court with basic legal analysis of the cases, judges must be 
paid, and the necessary infrastructure must be in place. 
Since a lack of financial resources can be a reasonable argument against 
a court, it will take strong political will to establish and financially 
sustain a court. If African states are determined to meet their financial 
obligations to the OAD, there is no doubt that a court will be established 
and gradually sustained. Judges need not begin on full-time basis. lOS It 
can also argued that prioritizing regional spending can help the financial 
situation of the regional organ. In 1991, the OAD promulgated the 
African Economic Treaty which provides for the Establishment of an 
African Court of Justice. The treaty aims at African economic 
integration and unity. Also, the African Charter on the Rights of the 
Child provides for a Committee that will perform a similar function, 
though particular to that Charter, as the African Commission does in 
respect of the African Charter. These other mechanisms are equally 
important. Africa needs economic integration and unity as much as it 
needs human rights enforcement. There still needs to be proper fiscal 
diScipline in the face of scarce resources. The commitment of the richer 
African countries should be directed to uplifting the region rather than to 
elevating domestic corruption to the level of an industry. 
In the opinion of this author, all that is required is the determination of 
African states to take the bold step in this direction. Donor agencies and 
other international development institutions under the auspices of the 
107. Under Article 41 of the African Charter the OAU sets the budget of the African 
Commission. 
108. It would be expedient, however, for the president of the court to serve full time to ensure 
effective coordination of the activities of the court. See Article 18(2) of the draft Protocol to the 
African Charter on the establishment of an African Court. 
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United Nations should in tum lend a helping hand. The possible political 
implication of such aid is apparent. On the other hand, it is a truism that 
human rights has become everyone's concern. The international 
community could demonstrate its concern for human rights in Africa by 
helping in this regard. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Resolution of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of 
the OAU at its summit in Tunis in June 1994 requesting the Secretary 
General of the OAU to convene a government experts' meeting to 
consider, in conjunction with the African Commission, the means to 
enhance the efficiency of the Mrican Commission and to consider the 
establishment of an Mrican Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, is the 
beginning of a new era in African human rights jurisprudence. In the last 
few years, the African Commission has begun to find its way by using its 
implied powers to address some of the human rights situations in Africa. 
It could be argued that this resolution is indicative of the inadequacy of 
the present mechanism under the Mrican Charter. 
It has been the goal of this paper to demonstrate that an African Court of 
Human Rights that genuinely draws on the experiences of the European 
and Inter-American systems will enhance the protection of human rights 
in Africa. A court can make a great difference in human rights 
enforcement. The psychological effect of an international court's 
judgment on a state is critical. The stage has been set by the resolution 
of the AHSG and the subsequent meeting of government experts in 
South Africa in 1995 which came up with a draft Protocol to the African 
Charter. The draft Protocol will need further refinement to realize its 
potential in light of the reforms proposed by this paper. 
This paper has shown that while the exercise of implied power may be 
desirable, it may not go far enough if challenged. The challenge will 
come not before a court of law, but in the blatant refusal of a state to 
comply with the Commission's bidding. A decision by the Commission 
is not binding, and has never been enforced by any regional entity. A 
better solution is to increase the Commission's effectiveness in 
functioning under the reforms proposed by this paper. Therefore, a 
complete reform of the present African mechanism is necessary to 
promote, protect, and enforce human rights in Africa. 
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